Locating health diplomacy through African negotiations on performance‐based funding in global health by Barnes, A.J. et al.
This is a repository copy of Locating health diplomacy through African negotiations on 
performance based funding in global health‐ .




Barnes, A.J., Brown, G. and Harman, S. (2015) Locating health diplomacy through African 
negotiations on performance based funding in global health. Journal of Health Diplomacy, ‐




This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
JOURNAL	OF	(EALT(	D)PLOMACY		
	

































national【principal	 recipients┸	 leaving	 aside	 discussion	 of	 internal	 negotiating	mechanisms	within	 state	 bodies【Country	 Coordination	Mechanisms	 ゅCCMsょ	 or	how	)NGOs【NGOs	influence	these	processes┻			Through	this	examination	it	is	possible	to	conclude	that	although	some	phases	of	the	 negotiation	 process	 display	 conditions	 of	 equitable	 consonance	 between	stakeholders	 in	 terms	 of	 recognized	 health	 priorities	 and	 the	 importance	 of	cooperative	health	 initiatives┸	 the	negotiations	themselves	often	operate	within	frameworks	that	 limit	African	negotiations	 in	profound	ways┻	As	a	result┸	 if	 the	substantive	quality	of	global	health	diplomacy	 is	 to	be	 judged	on	the	perceived	quality	 of	mutually	 consistent	 negotiations	 and	 outcomes	 ゅDrager	 et	 al┻┸	 にどどど┹	Raiffa┸	にどどばょ┸	then	the	evidence	suggests	that	current	practice	of	PBF	modalities	is	 often	 in	 tension	 with	 more	 idealized	 G(D	 understandings	 of	 mutually	consistent	negotiation┻	)t	is	possible┸	therefore┸	to	locate	asymmetrical	influence	and	 power	 that	 negatively	 affect	 diplomatic	 relations	 as	 they	 concern	 global	health	financing┻	
	





understanding	 of	 PBF┹	 ぬょ	 knowledge	 of	 decision┽making	 and	 negotiation	processes┹	 ねょ	 influence	 on	 process┹	 and	 のょ	 contextual	 aspects	 of	 strategic	planning┸	 input	 and	outcomes	of	PBF┻	The	 sample	 size	of	などな	participants	was	deemed	suitable	to	generate	significant	results	because┺	なょ	stakeholder	analysis	located	 the	main	 actors	 involved	 in	PBF	negotiation	 at	 the	 outset	 and	ongoing	stakeholder	 analysis	 was	 allowed	 as	 processes	 of	 snowballing	 revealed	 new	stakeholders	during	interviews┹	にょ	there	was	variation	in	the	elite	stakeholders	interviewed┸	 with	 interviews	 across	 the	 different	 sectors	 represented	ゅgovernment┸	civil	society┸	private	sector┸	external	fundersょ┹	ぬょ	the	data	became	saturated	 ゅrepetition	 of	 data	 across	 intervieweesょ┹	 and	 ねょ	 qualitative	interviewing	 and	 analysis	 is	 well	 suited	 to	 capture	 subjective【intersubjective	understandings	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 PBF	 and	 processes	 of	 negotiation┻	 This	 is	because	 qualitative	 semi┽structured	 interview	 techniques	 allow	 for	 greater	investigation	 for	why	a	particular	 view	 is	 held	by	 an	 interviewee	 as	well	 as	 to	allow	 follow┽up	 questions	 to	 uncover	 the	 underlying	 rationale	 for	why	 such	 a	view	was	held┻		During	 the	 analysis	 phase┸	main	 concepts	 and	 themes	were	 identified	 through	familiarization	 with	 the	 interview	 material┻	 Familiarization	 took	 place	 during	interviews	and	by	 thoroughly	 reading	 through	 the	 transcripts┻	Thus┸	 there	was	no	 clear┽cut	 border	 between	 the	 interview	 phase	 and	 the	 analysis	 phase┻	 The	floating	character	of	 this	analysis	allowed	the	researchers	to	better	understand	the	subject	of	 inquiry┸	which	related	to	perceptions	of	participation	 in	PBF	and	the	perceived	quality	of	that	participation┻	Further	analysis	of	the	research	data	progressed	 in	 an	 iterative	 way	 using	 thematic	 analysis	 ゅsorting┸	 labeling┸	summarizing	 data	 using	 predefined	 concepts	 such	 as	 understanding┸	assumptions┸	 rationales	 and	 meaningsょ┸	 while	 also	 identifying	 new┸	 emergent	themes┸	 detecting	 patterns	 and	 developing	 explanations	 to	 answer	 research	questions┻	The	analysis	below	represents	key	categorizations┻	
	
Analytical	Framework	The	original	EQU)NET	Discussion	Paper	ゅBarnes	et	al┻┸	にどなねょ	analyzed	the	data	via	 the	 thematic	 analysis	 described	 above┻	 )n	 this	 article┸	 we	 have	 extended	analysis	 by	 employing	 Zartman	 and	 Berman╆s	 ゅなひぱにょ	 negotiated	 agreement	





にょ	 the	 exact	 terms	 of	 agreement	 in	 relation	 to	 who	 has	 obligations	 and	 the	expected	 delivery	 of	 those	 obligations┹	 and	 ぬょ	 exact	 enumeration	 of	 the	agreement╆s	 length	 or	 time	 limit┻	 )t	 is	 in	 this	 final	 negotiation	 phase	 where	requirements【mechanisms	 regarding	 policy	 implementation┸	 monitoring	 and	arbitration	of	 future	disputes	are	 stipulated	and	defined┻	Moreover┸	 this	model	was	selected	because	it	has	historical	application	in	relation	to	analyzing	global	health	diplomacy	specifically	and	thus	has	a	level	of	acceptance	as	an	analytical	heuristic	that	can	contextualize	negotiation	processes	ゅLister	and	Lee┸	にどなぬょ┻		Although	Zartman	and	Barman	offer	 a	 useful	model	 for	understanding	 various	phases	 of	 negotiation┸	 they	 do	 not	 provide	 criteria	 to	 determine	 the	 quality	 of	negotiated	 agreements	 and【or	 the	 factors	 required	 to	 deliver	 long┽term	 and	continued	 policy	 success┻	 As	 suggested	 by	 Berridge	 ゅにどどのょ┸	 ╅good╆	 diplomacy	involves	 the	 development	 of	 relationships	 and	 mutual	 understanding	 that	provide	a	 context	 for	meaningful	 continuance	of	negotiations	 toward	 the	 long┽term	 resolution	 of	 collective	 action	 problems┻	 The	 negotiation	 criteria	 for	developing	these	forms	of	╅mutually	consistent╆┸	long┽term	relationships	include	enhancing	 perceptions	 of	 trust┸	 creating	 clear	 processes	 for	 effective	communication┸	 generating	 perceived	 win┽win	 outcomes	 and	 assuring	 mutual	agreement	via	consensus	ゅRaiffa┸	にどどば┹	Lister	┃	Lee┸	にどなぬ┸	ぱにょ┻	)n	addition┸	it	is	generally	 accepted	 that	 these	 conditions	 are	 significantly	 undermined	 by	perceptions	 of	 force┸	 coercion┸	 asymmetric	 power┸	 unclear	 decision┽making	procedures┸	 a	 lack	 of	 reason┽giving	 and	 limited	 or	 unidirectional	 arbitration	mechanisms	and	accountability	chains	ゅStarkey	et	al┻┸	にどなどょ┻	For	our	purposes┸	if	the	 ultimate	 aim	 of	 G(D	 is	 to	 ╉result	 in	 both	 better	 health	 security	 and	population	 health	 outcomes	 for	 each	 of	 the	 countries	 involved	 as	 well	 as	improving	the	relations	between	states	and	strengthening	the	commitment	of	a	wide	range	of	actors╊	ゅKickbusch	et	al┻┸	にどなぬ┸	ね┹	Drager┸	にどどなょ┸	then	the	aims	of	G(D	 ultimately	 depend	 on	 the	 perceived	 quality	 of	 the	 health	 negotiations	involved┻	 As	 will	 be	 argued	 below	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 negotiation	 of	 PBF┸	 the	findings	 of	 this	 study	 suggest	 that	 current	 PBF	 modalities	 undermine	 these	negotiation	 ideals	 and	 that	 problems	 of	 asymmetrical	 power	 and	 influence	continue	 to	 significantly	 affect	 diplomatic	 relations	 as	 they	 concern	 African	actors	and	global	health	financing┻		
Results	and	Discussion	As	 indicated	 above┸	 Zartman	 and	 Berman	 ゅなひぱにょ	 distinguish	 three	 phases	 of	negotiation	 between	 interested	 parties	 active	 in	 reaching	 agreement┺	 a	diagnostic	 phase┸	 a	 formula	 phase	 and	 a	 negotiation	 phase┻	 The	 case	 evidence	suggests	 mixed	 perceptions	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 PBF	 negotiations	 across	 the	three	phases┸	which	provide	insights	on	African	diplomacy	in	terms	of	negotiated	PBF	programs	and	how	the	quality	of	these	outcomes	are	often	asymmetrically	skewed	by	power	and	influence┻	
	





health	financing┸	namely┺	なょ	the	disease	burden	in	Africa	represents	a	priority	for	global	health	and	for	global	health	financing	in	particular┹	にょ	external	financing	is	required	 and	 should	 be	 promoted	 through	 increased	 finance	 partnerships┹	 ぬょ	external	 funders	 prefer	 PBF	 as	 the	 mechanism	 for	 delivering	 global	 health	financing┸	 and┹	 ねょ	 global	 health	 targets┸	 including	 those	 in	 the	 Millennium	Development	 Goals	 ゅMDGsょ┸	 inevitably	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 PBF	 target	setting	between	external	funders	and	recipients┻			Although	the	results	above	raise	intriguing	questions	about	the	scale	and	depth	of	norm	diffusion	between	negotiating	parties┸	for	the	purposes	of	this	article┸	it	is	the	apparent	acceptance	of	PBF	as	a	preferred	modality	of	health	financing	that	reveals	interesting	diagnostic	openings	and	closures	for	African	diplomats	within	negotiation	 processes┻	 )n	 particular┸	 in	 all	 cases	 examined┸	 there	 is	 clear	





of	particular	cases	where	PBF	had	been	seen	to	be	effective┸	such	as	in	Rwanda	and	Burundi┸	 but	 the	direct	 evidence	 for	 such	 claims	was	often	admitted	 to	be	based	more	 on	 ╉everyday	 conversations	 and	not	 from	any	 report	 or	 evidence╊	ゅGENぬ┸	Sept┻	にどなぬょ┻		)n	 terms	 of	 how	 the	 preferred	 status	 of	 PBF	 affects	 the	diagnostic	quality	 of	 a	negotiated	agreement┸	the	evidence	suggests	that	the	way	PBF	is	structuralized		by	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 GFATM	 closes	 off	 other	 potentially	 more	 suitable	modalities	for	delivering	funding┻	)n	other	words┸	the	intellectual	space	available	to	conceive	of	alternative	models	for	finance	negotiation	is	restricted	within	the	diagnostic	phase	due	 to	 the	dominance	of	PBF	and	 the	pressure	 to	accept	 it	as	the	only	topic	for	health	negotiations┻	As	one	W(O	representative	stated┸			
I	dont	think	there	is	a	great	deal	of	argument	taking	place	about	the	risks	
of	 these	 types	 of	 funding	 mechanisms	 	 on	 the	 whole	 donors	 and	






on	the	details	of	aid	delivery	(GEN5,	Sept.	2013).			A	number	of	interviewees	expressed	a	level	of	frustration	that	PBF	was	not	being	╅properly╆	and	╅fully	debated╆	at	the	W(O	or	with	funding	institutions	themselves	because	of	its	╅unquestioned	status╆	ゅGENに┸	Sept┻	にどなぬ┹	GENね┸	Sept┻	にどなぬ┹	GENは┸	Sept┻	 にどなぬょ┻	 What	 this	 suggests┸	 is	 that	 within	 global	 health	 diplomacy┸	 the	
diagnostic	 phase	 of	 the	 PBF	 negotiation	 process	 is	 essentially	 fixed┸	 with	negotiations	mainly	taking	place	about	how	to	get	funding	or	to	implement	PBF	in	Africa┸	 and	not	 about	 the	overall	 appropriateness	 of	PBF	as	 a	health	 reform	tool	itself┻				
	
Formula	Phase		The	 case	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 broad	 accord	 between	 negotiating	parties	 ゅfunders┸	 national【principal	 recipientsょ	 about	 the	 normative	 principles	that	should	ideally	underwrite	PBF	procedures	and	that	these	principles	should	act	 as	 foundational	 aims	 for	 negotiated	 agreement┻	 For	 example┺	 なょ	 there	 is	unified	 recognition	 that	 PBF	 agreements	 should	 reflect	 the	 2005	 Paris	
Declaration	 on	 Aid	 Effectiveness	 ゅPDAE┸	 にどどのょ┸	 which	 stresses	 national	ownership┸	 alignment┸	 harmonization┸	 managing	 for	 results	 and	 mutual	accountability┹	にょ	there	is	unanimous	stakeholder	commitment	to	both	the	2008	





some	way	represent	an	equitable	distribution	of	obligatory	benefits	and	burdens	across	all	parties┻	As	a	result┸	in	relation	to	the	ideal	aims	of	negotiation┸	there	is	general	 understanding	 between	 stakeholders	 regarding	what	 PBF	 negotiations	should	aim	to	capture	as	well	as	recognition	of	the	MDGs	as	goals	from	which	the	success	of	health	diplomacy	should	be	ultimately	 judged┻	This	meta┽theoretical	understanding	resonates	with	the	previously	outlined	criteria	deemed	necessary	for	 fostering	 ╅mutually	 consistent╆	 negotiations	 ゅRaffia┸	 にどどば┹	 Starkey	 et	 al┻┸	にどなどょ	 and	 the	 basic	 diplomatic	 negotiating	 conditions	 required	 to	 satisfy	 the	long┽term	 aims	 of	 G(D	 ゅBerridge┸	 にどどのょ┻	 (owever┸	 despite	 a	 basic	 meta┽theoretical	understanding	regarding	what	the	procedures	and	outcomes	of	PBF	should	normatively	resemble┸	as	will	be	illustrated	below┸	the	current	practice	of	PBF	negotiations	exhibit	 inherent	asymmetric	 tensions	 in	 its	perceived	quality┸	which	suggests	a	sizeable	distance	between	theory	and	practice┻			





PBF	evidence	agenda	ゅGENぬ┸	Sept┻	にどなね┹	ZAMに┸	Nov┻	にどなね┹	Barnes	et	al┻┸	にどなのょ┻	)n	setting	final	targets┸	most	interviewees	related	that	the	Zambian	government	was	able	to	push	its	own	agenda┸	but	that	╉the	World	Bank	certainly	had	its	own	ideas╊	which	had	to	be	 incorporated	 into	the	 final	PBF	agreement	and	were┸	 to	some	 extent┸	 non┽negotiable┸	 since	 the	 conditions	 were	 attached	 to	 the	possibility	 of	 receiving	 much	 needed	 funding	 ゅGENぬ┸	 Sept┻	 にどなぬょ┻	 As	 a	 result┸	interviewees	 revealed	 a	 high	 level	 of	 frustration	 at	 cumbersome	 or	 dogmatic	conditionalities	 set	 by	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 GFATM┻	 According	 to	 one	 country	representative	in	Geneva┸			
this	 is	 not	 partnership	 and	 although	 PBF	 is	 good,	 it	 cant	 be	 rolled	 out	
exactly	 the	 same	way	 everywhere	 and	 better	 distinctions	 of	 capacity	 and	





form	 of	 line	 items	 being	 struck	 from	 a	 grant	 document	 just	 before	implementation	or	could	take	the	form	of	requests	to	add	certain	provisions	to	official	documentation	as	the	PBF	projects	were	scaling	up┻	For	example┸	in	South	Africa┸	 a	 member	 of	 UNA)DS	 who	 has	 worked	 with	 many	 recipients	 in	 Africa	argued	that	GFATM	often	╉changed	the	goal	posts	and	as	a	result	lost	the	trust	of	many	 partners╊	 ゅSAぬ┸	 Feb┻	 にどなぬょ┻	 )n	 addition┸	 several	 private	 sector	 actors	suggested	 that	 ╉the	 private	 sector	 dislikes	 uncertainty┸	 especially	 when	investment	 is	 involved╊	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 GFATM	 continued	 last	 minute	alterations	was	threatening	future	public┽private	partnerships	ゅSAね┸	Feb┻	にどなぬょ┻	)n	 Tanzania┸	 officials	 suggested	 that	 having	 to	 accept	 last	minute	 changes	was	part	and	parcel	of	the	funding	relationship┸	claiming	that			
we	are	the	ones	that	want	the	money,	they	always	have	the	upper	hand	
okay	 they	 bring	 that	 one	 there,	 you	 read	 through	 it,	 it	 has	 all	 the	





to	meet	Bank	standards	ゅBarnes	et	al┻┸	にどなのょ┻	Second┸	 it	was	commonly	related	that	 funder	 reporting	 schemes	 could	 be	 changed	 mid┽project	 with	 little	consideration	 of	 the	 ramp┽up	 time	 needed┻	 According	 to	 different	 high┽level	officials	 in	 South	 Africa┸	 ╉the	 Fund	 continues	 to	 change	 the	 conditional	regulations┸	but	not	always	with	sufficient	warning╊	ゅSAに┸	Feb┻	にどなぬょ┻	This	ability	to	change	reporting	systems	without	additional	negotiation	or	consultation	was	not	 only	 seen	 by	 many	 African	 actors	 as	 undermining	 effective	 program	implementation┸	but	also	as	an	unfair	ability	to	dictate	non┽negotiable	terms┻			Like	 monitoring	 above┸	 the	 evaluation	 of	 performance	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 PBF	agreements	 and┸	 in	 theory┸	 there	 should	 be	 entry	points	 for	different	 actors	 to	negotiate	outcomes┻	)n	practice┸	however┸	evaluation	was	also	seen	as	a	point	for	
closing	down	negotiations┸	given	that	any	sign	of	non┽performance	could	result	in	 grant【loan	 termination┻	 Furthermore┸	 given	 that	 PBF	 tends	 to	 involve	 the	changing	 of	 goalposts	 after	 contracts【project	 agreements	 have	 been	 signed┸	actors	 often	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 understand	 what	 constitutes	 adequate	performance	and┸	therefore┸	any	delay	by	extending	negotiations	was	deemed	as	a	 disproportionate	 risk	 to	 recipients	 ゅBarnes	 et	 al┻┸	 にどなのょ┻	 For	 example┸	 this	sense	of	uncertainty	and	risk	associated	with	PBF	was	reported	throughout	the	Zambian	case	and	at	all	levels┹	with	health	workers	suggesting	uncertainty	about	what	 performance	meant	 and	what	 avenues	 existed	 for	 additional	 discussions	when	discrepancies	occurred	within	the	evaluation	process	ゅBarnes	et	al┻┸	にどなのょ┻	Lastly┸	 nearly	 all	 interviewees	 held	 the	 belief	 that	 there	 was	 ╉zero	 flexibility	when	 it	 comes	 to	 meeting	 targets╊	 and	 that	 additional	 room	 for	 negotiation	regarding	performance	evaluation	was	often	closed	off	by	both	the	World	Bank	and	 GFATM	 ゅSAは┸	 Feb┻	 にどなぬ┹	 Barnes	 et	 al┻┸	 にどなのょ┻	 A	 further	 lack	 of	 GFATM	flexibility	in	the	face	of	external	circumstances	beyond	the	control	of	recipients	was	also	illustrated┻	As	one	UNA)DS	official	remarked┸			
There	 is	 no	 flexibility	 in	 regards	 to	 external	 circumstances.	 This	 is	
particularly	 problematic	 in	 cases	 of	 extreme	 currency	 fluctuations	where	
funds	can	be	reduced	by	20%	within	a	quick	period	of	time	leaving	principal	
recipients	underfunded,	yet	responsible	 to	deliver	 the	same	 targets	agreed	








1.5	months	 to	assemble	and	 there	 is	no	partnership	 in	 this	process	 (SA5,	
Feb.	2013).			More	 broadly	 across	 the	 three	 case	 studies┸	 African	 actors	 often	 stated	 an	uncertainty	 about	 how	 to	 take	 arbitration	 cases	 forward┸	 the	 procedures	involved	 or	 what	 legal	 jurisdiction	 or	 laws	 applied	 ゅBarnes	 et	 al┻┸	 にどなのょ┻	 This	suggests┸	along	with	 the	aforementioned	 issues┸	 that	 the	quality	of	negotiations	within	 PBF	 schemes	 remains	 wanting┸	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 more	normative	understandings	of	global	health	diplomacy	as	a	potential	mechanism	to	coordinate	mutually	consistent	and	agreed	health	policies	that	will	╉ultimately	improve	and	save	lives╊	by	improving	long┽term	diplomatic	relations	ゅMarten	et	al┻┸	にどなねょ┻			
Conclusion	African	 actors	 within	 national	 governments	 generally	 set	 and	 negotiate	performance	 targets	 of	 PBF	 schemes┸	 yet	 the	 quality	 of	 PBF	 negotiations	with	external	 funders	 remains	 inconsistent	 in	 practice┸	 suggesting	 the	 existence	 of	asymmetrical	 power	 and	 influence	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 those	negotiations┻	This	raises	questions	about	the	level	of	power	and	influence	being	exerted	by	external	funders	and	how	much	negotiation	leverage	African	political	actors	 have	 available	 to	 them	 within	 global	 health	 diplomacy┻	 African	negotiations	are	often	stymied	at	various	phases	of	the	PBF	negotiation	process┸	and	evidence	suggests	that	the	financial	mechanisms	offered	by	external	funders	steer	 and	 limit	 the	 quality	 of	 these	 negotiations	 themselves┻	 This	 is	 largely	because	 certain	 aspects	 of	 PBF	 are	 often	 closed	 off	 and	 restricted	 from	negotiation┸	which	 is	 institutionalized	 at	 each	 phase	 of	 Zartman	 and	 Berman╆s	
negotiated	agreement	model	 ゅなひぱにょ┻	 These	 closures	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	 PBF	ideational	dominance	that	closes	out	finance	alternatives┻	This	comes	in	the	form	of	non┽negotiable	grant【loan	conditionalities	that	set	limits	to	the	types	of	health	interventions	 or	 targets	 available	 for	 negotiation┻	 )n	 addition┸	 it	 includes	 non┽negotiable	 reporting┸	 evaluation	 and	 arbitration	 mechanisms	 that	 inherently	restrict	 further	 abilities	 to	 negotiate	 agreement	 alterations	 in	 the	 face	 of	changing	 conditions	 on	 the	 ground┻	 African	 actors	 could	 of	 course	 seek	 to	challenge	 these	 restrictions	 more	 overtly┸	 yet	 this	 would	 risk	 conflict	 and	 the	subsequent	closing	down	of	access	to	health	systems	funding┻	)f	we	are	to	judge	the	 quality	 of	 African	 health	 diplomacy	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 PBF	negotiations	within	 global	 health	 policy┸	 then	 PBF┸	 as	 it	 is	 currently	 practiced┸	exhibits	 asymmetrical	 power	 and	 influence	 by	 funders	 that	 greatly	 affect	diplomatic	relations	and	the	future	success	of	G(D┻	
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